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Abstract
We provide a philosophical reconstruction and analysis of the debate on the scientific status
of cosmic inflation that has played out in recent years. In a series of critical papers, Ijjas et
al. have questioned the scientificality of the current views on cosmic inflation. Proponents
of cosmic inflation have in turn defended the scientific credentials of their approach. We
argue that, while this defense, narrowly construed, is successful against Ijjas et al., the
latters’ reasoning does point to a significant epistemic issue that arises with respect to
inflation. A broadening of the concept of theory assessment is needed to address that issue
in an adequate way.
1 Introduction
String theory, variations of the multiverse idea, and inflationary cosmology have become dom-
inant, influential paradigms in various parts of theoretical physics over the last few decades.
While the ideas behind these paradigms are to some extent speculative, their supporters main-
tain that there are nevertheless good reasons not only to pursue them further in their research
but to regard them as genuinely well-supported and evidentially justified. Of course, not all
of the promise of these ideas has been realized over the years. So it is that they have found
their (often very vocal) critics, who inveigh against these supporters for violating “the scientific
method,” by maintaining empirically invalidated, unscientific, or otherwise defective ideas.
The cosmic controversy which is our interest in this paper concerns the status of inflation-
ary cosmology, according to which the early universe underwent a brief stage of accelerated
expansion, “cosmic inflation,” which contributes to explaining the near spatial flatness and ho-
mogeneity of the present day universe, at least in the standard view, and the perturbations in the
early universe which gave rise to structure formation in the universe (McCoy, 2015). In a series
of articles, Ijjas et al. (2013, 2014, 2017) argue, however, that observational results from the
Planck satellite put significant pressure on the inflationary paradigm, particularly the models
disfavored by the data which they call the “classic” inflationary paradigm. In a response, Guth
et al. (2014, 2017) defend a wider, more flexible framework that Ijjas et al. pejoratively call
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the “postmodern” inflationary paradigm. Ijjas et al. claim that this approach to inflation is “a
construct that lies outside of normal science” (Ijjas et al., 2014, 145), arguing that the only way
it will work “is by delicately designing all the test criteria and data” (Ijjas et al., 2013, 264) into
its models—that is, by simply evading any potential falsifying data by ad hoc accommodation.
They conclude that it is time to begin seriously considering adopting an alternative approach to
early universe cosmology.
Although this is first and foremost a debate among scientists, the philosophical tenor of
the discussions is unmissable: Ijjas et al. explicitly advocate a likelihoodist standard for the
empirical validity of a scientific paradigm and reject ad hoc accommodation in order to adjust
likelihoods to favor an invalidated paradigm; Guth et al. explicitly defend an empiricist criterion
of empirical validity, while advocating the inflationary paradigm on the basic of theoretical
virtues like fruitfulness, explanatory power, and accuracy. Nevertheless, they champion various
different philosophical ideas in a way that only leads them to talk past one another, and the
debate appears to end in a stalemate.
Our first task in this paper is to reconstruct the arguments of this debate carefully (§2).
We do so because that reconstruction will reveal a significant problem for inflationary cosmol-
ogy that can be extracted from the arguments of Ijjas et al, one to which Guth et al. do not
provide an adequate response. The actual, literal arguments made by Ijjas et al., as we show,
are convincingly rebutted by Guth et al.’s defense of inflationary cosmology. However, when
those arguments are refined by situating them in formal likelihoodist and Bayesian confirma-
tion frameworks (§3), it is clear that, in theories like inflation, there is no basis for generating
significant confirmation of the paradigm (due to, e.g., its flexibility in generating models).
While Guth et al. are right that individual inflationary models are empirically testable and
some are indeed empirically adequate, thereby insuring the empirical validity of the paradigm,
this point threatens the scientific mechanism of generating credence in the viability of the
paradigm.1 In other words, the reasoning underlying Ijjas et al.’s critique raises doubts as
to whether inflationary cosmology can provide any grounds to believe that it is on the right
track. We argue, however, that the viability of inflationary cosmology can nevertheless be se-
cured by indirect means. Theoretical physicists who support paradigms like string theory, the
multiverse, and inflationary cosmology have deployed these distinctive indirect means (albeit
unsystematically) by appealing to what have been called “non-” or “meta-empirical” consid-
erations (Dawid, 2013). We show (§4) how the combination of both meta-empirical evidence
and observational data can contribute to the confirmation of a paradigm, even when individual
models, like those falling within the inflationary paradigm, cannot admit of confirmation due to
the problem we extract from Ijjas et al.’s arguments. We sum up our argument in the conclusion
(§5).
2 Analysis: Inflationary Paradigm in Trouble?
In this section, we analyze Ijjas et al.’s arguments in their two critical papers on the inflationary
paradigm, which they wrote in light of the then new results of analyzing the Planck satellite’s
observations of the cosmic microwave background (CMB) radiation, as well as the responses
by Guth et al. Our aim is to clearly extract the essential philosophical points that are raised by
the two parties in their disagreements.
1A paradigm is viable on our account if there are grounds to trust that it has the resources to account for all
empirical data that can possibly be collected with a given empirical “horizon.”
2
2.1 Act I: Planck 2013
In their first critical paper, Ijjas et al. (2013) offer three principal arguments to challenge the
inflationary paradigm, each of which is intended to undermine the explanation for the precise
spectrum of inhomogeneities detected in the CMB made available by inflationary expansion.2
• The first is that “natural” initial conditions for the posited scalar field driving inflation,
the inflaton, make it such that inflationary expansion consistent with the Planck data is
unlikely to occur.
• The second is that the paradigm in general is not predictive, insofar as the inflationary
mechanism generically leads to a multiverse of “bubble universes.” This argument de-
pends on the well-known “measure problem” in multiverse theories (Freivogel, 2011),
which is the problem of supplying a probability measure that can be used to make con-
crete predictions within the multiverse. Without an appropriate and justified measure,
one cannot make predictions of what one expects to observe across the bubble universes
that make up the multiverse.
• The third concludes with the claim that “plateau”-like inflaton potentials favored by the
Planck data are “exponentially unlikely according to the inner logic of the inflationary
paradigm itself” (Ijjas et al., 2013, 263). The argument for this claim, and its significance,
requires some elaboration, and will be explained below.
Each of these arguments is evidently probabilistic in character, specifically depending on likeli-
hoods that Ijjas et al. maintain are essential for assessing the validity of any scientific paradigm,
including the inflationary paradigm:
In testing the validity of any scientific paradigm, the key criterion is whether mea-
surements agree with what is expected given the paradigm. In the case of inflation-
ary cosmology, this test can be divided into two questions: (A) are the observations
what is expected, given the inflaton potential X?, here the analysis assumes clas-
sical slow-roll, no multiverse, and ideal initial conditions; and (B) is the inflaton
potential X that fits the data what is expected according to the internal logic of the
paradigm?. In order to pass, both questions must be answered in the affirmative.
(Ijjas et al., 2013, 265, emphasis in original)
It follows that if a model is expected (that is, likely) according to the paradigm but the data is
surprising (unlikely) given the predictions of that model, then the paradigm is not supported
by the data via that model. It is also not supported if the data is expected given a model’s
predictions but that model is surprising according to the paradigm. Ijjas et al.’s first argument
disputes the likelihood of inflation to occur in a model with the empirically-favored plateau-
like potential given natural initial conditions (which they regard as a basic assumption of the
paradigm); their second and third arguments dispute the likelihood of plateau-like potentials
within the inflationary paradigm.
The epistemological view that Ijjas et al. endorse in the quoted passage, that probabilistic
likelihoods are crucial for assessing scientific paradigms, theories, or models, is sometimes ad-
vocated in the philosophy of science. One inducement to this so-called “likelihoodism” is a
2In the following, we use the terms “paradigm” and “theory” interchangeably, as the authors we discuss do.
These will, however, be distinguished from “models,” which are concrete exemplars of the theory/paradigm to
which they belong.
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desire to make “explanatory power” relevant to the assessment of (rival) hypotheses, while still
remaining broadly empiricist in orientation (Sober, 1990).3 The fundamental principle advo-
cated by likelihoodists is the “Law of Likelihood”: data (E) favors one hypothesis (H1) over
another (H2) just when the likelihood of the data according to H1 is greater than the likelihood
of the data according to H2, that is, P(E|H1) > P(E|H2).
Ijjas et al. venture one step beyond the typical likelihoodist (and, it would seem, empiricism)
by not only assessing the favorability of a model on the basis of the data’s expectability but also
by assessing the favorability of the paradigm via an assessment of the likelihoods of models of
that paradigm. The non-comparative “Law of Likelihood” that they in effect endorse would
read something like this: data (E) favor the paradigm (T) just when the likelihood of the data
according to the paradigm’s models (M) and the likelihood of those models according to the
paradigm is sufficiently high (c): P(E|T) =
∑
i[P(E|Mi) × P(Mi|T)] > c. The likelihood of the
data (with respect to the paradigm) factors into the two likelihoods mentioned in the quoted
passage above. Thus, one must be able not only to attribute likelihoods to the data with respect
to the models but also to attribute likelihoods to models of a paradigm in order to assess the
validity of that paradigm—the latter is plainly a non-empirical assessment.
Although explicit advocacy of this general perspective on hypothesis assessment may not be
especially common among philosophers of science, many cosmologists do in fact reason along
these lines in practice.4 The principal response (Guth et al., 2014) to Ijjas et al.’s arguments,
however, does not explicitly reject the likelihoodist standard of validity for a paradigm; instead,
it focuses on offering direct rebuttals to their three arguments. Nevertheless, one can glean a
significantly different methodological perspective from Guth et al.’s comments.
Guth et al. observe that the first problem, the “initial conditions problem,” is only a prob-
lem if one makes the precise assumptions that Ijjas et al. describe as “natural.” While these
assumptions were indeed seen as reasonable in the past, Guth et al. point out that they entail
that the inflaton’s potential is “essentially featureless between . . . the Planck era and the era of
observable inflation” (Guth et al., 2014, 114). Given the large separation in scale between the
Planck era and the inflationary one, this is clearly quite a strong assumption to make (albeit
a very simple one). This is particularly so given how little we know about physics over this
range of energies. Guth et al. argue that fine-tuning issues vis-à-vis initial conditions can be
avoided in what they take to be a much more plausible scenario: an inflaton with a complicated
potential, with various slopes, maxima, minima, etc. With such a potential, it is likely that
somewhere in the multiverse the field will tunnel to a point on the potential where slow-roll
inflation can occur. Guth et al. claim that “anthropic selection effects can then make it plausible
that we live in a pocket universe that evolved in this way” (Guth et al., 2014, 115). Put simply,
their rebuttal of Ijjas et al.’s first problem is that mandating certain “natural” initial conditions
is not a fundamental assumption of the inflationary paradigm but a convenient one.
The second problem, the failure of predictability in the multiverse, is acknowledged by
Guth et al. as a real problem, insofar as they agree that the multiverse measure problem exists
and needs to be solved. They hold that inflation is generically eternal and therefore entails a
multiverse, which demands a measure so that probabilistic predictions can be made across its
array of bubble universes. The current level of understanding of inflation and the multiverse
does not, however, unequivocally enforce a specific choice of the measure on physical grounds.
Nevertheless, Guth et al. insist that the measure problem does not affect the narrowly predic-
3A very strict empiricist, of course, only requires logical compatibility between hypothesis and data.
4Although we would be inclined to reject likelihoodism on general grounds—for some relevant criticism, see
(Fitelson, 2007, 2011)—our objection to Ijjas et al.’s arguments is tied to details emerging from the specific case
at hand.
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tive use of inflationary models, for “one need not know how our observable universe came to
undergo its final phase of inflation in order to make specific, quantitative predictions for observ-
able quantities today” (Guth et al., 2014, 115) (i.e., one need not know how bubble universes
are probabilistically generated in order to make quantitative predictions from specific models
of inflation).
Surely Guth et al. are correct about this much, for if the measure problem precluded the
predictive use of inflationary models, then the Planck Collaboration could not describe their
data as supporting certain inflationary models (as they do). Their response to the second prob-
lem, however, defends only the validity of inflationary models against the measure problem, a
point which Ijjas et al. would certainly grant. Ijjas et al.’s concern is more general, namely, with
the inability to specify the likelihoods of models of inflation given the inflationary paradigm,
which they claim undermines the validity of the paradigm, not the predictive use of individual
models. They maintain that the fact that some models (of a paradigm) are predictively verified
should not validate the paradigm by that fact alone (which, incidentally, is a point with which
we agree, although for different reasons, as will be seen).
Guth et al. counter Ijjas et al.’s likelihoodism here by insisting on a strict empiricist crite-
rion of paradigm validation: a scientific paradigm is observationally validated if at least one
(well-motivated) model makes predictions that agree with observations (Guth et al., 2014, 112,
115). Since all parties agree that there are such models for the inflationary paradigm, they
conclude that the inflationary paradigm is indeed observationally validated. Hence, Guth et al.
are unmoved by Ijjas et al.’s more general worry, for they interpret it merely as Ijjas et al.’s ad-
mission of a low prior credence in eternal inflation’s multiverse cosmology, in contrast to their
own comparatively high credence in it.5 They conclude that, “since the measure problem is not
fully solved, [Ijjas et al.] are certainly justified in using their intuition to decide that eternal
inflation seems unlikely to them. To us, the measure problem is simply an important problem
that remains to be solved” (Guth et al., 2014, 115).
Ijjas et al.’s third argument, as said, requires some elaboration. Its conclusion is that the
plateau-like models favored by the Planck results are unlikely with respect to the inflationary
paradigm itself. These particular models have potentials with two symmetric minima (at some
field strength), are plateau-shaped in between the minima, and increase from the minima in a
roughly power-law fashion on the side of the minima away from the plateau. Ijjas et al. make
the following two points in support of their conclusion:
• First, they argue that slow-roll inflation down the “sides” of the plateau (the field “slides”
down the potential to the minima, thereby causing inflation) is unlikely since the “width”
of the plateau field values is small compared to the range of field values where inflation
is possible along the power-law slope. To illustrate, imagine that a field value that leads
to inflation is picked at random (with the tacit assumption of a uniform probability along
the field values); since the width of the power-law part of the potential is much larger
than the plateau part, one infers that it is unlikely that inflation occurred by a slow-roll
down the plateau (this, however, being precisely what observations suggest happens).6
• Second, they argue that much more inflationary expansion occurs along the power-law
part of the potential; that is, the number of times the universe doubles in size while
inflating is much larger when the field rolls down the power-law part of the potential as
compared to the number when the field rolls down the plateau part. Ijjas et al. assume a
5Thus, Guth et al. here advocate what looks like a conventional Bayesian perspective on hypothesis assessment.
6A simplified, illustrated version of this argument can be found in their Scientific American article: (Ijjas et al.,
2017).
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similar uniform measure of probability in the context of this second claim too, supposing
that larger bubble universes (associated with appropriate initial conditions and potentials
for greater growth) in the multiverse are more probable by such a “volume-weighting”
measure.
Since both plateau-like potentials and the initial conditions of the field associated with slow-
roll down the plateau are unlikely according to these measures, they should not be expected with
respect to the inflationary paradigm, which, according to Ijjas et al.’s likelihoodist criterion, in-
validates the inflationary paradigm. Guth et al.’s rejoinder to the first of these two points is
simply that “there is no way of knowing whether we should expect [inflation] to have occurred
on the plateau or on the power-law part of the potential” (Guth et al., 2014, 116). That is, the
paradigm gives us no theory of initial conditions with which we could assess where inflation is
likely to begin. Their response to the second is similar. They admit that Ijjas et al.’s preferred
volume-weighting measure is one possible proposal to solve the multiverse measure problem,
but they claim that it is one that has since been found to provide an inadequate solution. Guth et
al. thus argue that there is no good reason to follow Ijjas et al. in their preferred assumptions for
computing likelihoods. Although simplicity perhaps favors a uniform measure for the initial
field value and the volume weighting measure, these are nothing more than plausible assump-
tions which can be (and have been) discarded in the course of further investigations. They are
not fundamental assumptions of the inflationary paradigm.
Before moving to act two, it is worth mentioning that, while their paper is primarily focused
on rebutting Ijjas et al.’s criticisms of the inflationary paradigm, Guth et al. do provide positive
arguments in support of the inflationary paradigm, that is, over and above the mere validation
of certain models of the paradigm by the Planck results. Indeed, they insist that “inflationary
cosmology rests on very firm foundations” (Guth et al., 2014, 118), emphasizing that it is
self-consistent, well-motivated by building on well-understood theories (like quantum field
theory in curved spacetime), has passed every single empirical test of its predictions (whereas
competitors, like the topological defects theory, have not), offers explanations for puzzling
features of our universe, and has the resources with which to address important questions about
the very early universe (Guth et al., 2014, 112–3, 118). These comments suggest, at minimum,
a cautious hypothetico-deductivist or Bayesian empiricism supplemented with the pragmatic
consideration of “theoretical virtues” (in contrast to the extra-empirical likelihoodism of Ijjas
et al.).
2.2 Act II: Inflationary Schism?
In their first paper, Ijjas et al. attempt to show that the likelihood of the Planck data with
respect to the inflationary paradigm as a whole is such as to invalidate the paradigm (or at least
substantially disconfirm it). Guth et al. respond that in each case Ijjas et al.’s assessments are
based on faulty assumptions which should be rejected: what Ijjas et al. call “natural initial
conditions” and the probability measures assumed by them in their “unlikeliness problem” are
overly simplistic, and the lack of a solution to the measure problem does not entail that it
cannot be solved, nor does it automatically invalidate the inflationary paradigm. Ijjas et al.
respond to these rebuttals in (Ijjas et al., 2014), where they shift their argument to the claim
that a “schism” has emerged between what they describe as the “old” inflationary scenario
(“classical inflation,” as Ijjas et al. call it), which was their intended target in (Ijjas et al., 2013),
and the inflationary scenario (“postmodern inflation,” as Ijjas et al. call it) that Guth et al. use
to rebut their arguments in (Guth et al., 2014). Ijjas et al. insist that their arguments against
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classical inflation are unaffected by Guth et al.’s response (i.e., classical inflation is invalidated
by Planck’s data), and then press further arguments against “postmodern inflation,” claiming
that it dispenses with well-accepted canons of scientific methodology. Thus, they insist that
inflationary cosmologists face an uncomfortable dilemma, one with unpalatable consequences
on both horns. Ijjas et al. take this to suggest the need for an alternative paradigm:
The scientific question we may be facing in the near future is: If classic inflation
is outdated and a failure, are we willing to accept postmodern inflation, a construct
that lies outside normal science? Or is it time to seek an alternative cosmological
paradigm? (Ijjas et al., 2014, 145)
Inflationary cosmologists, however, would certainly reject the idea that there is a “schism”
between different kinds of inflation, maintaining that there is a clear historical and conceptual
continuity between the inflationary cosmology of the past and present: inflationary cosmology
is just a single paradigm. Granted, like most theoretical paradigms in science, it is composed
of many specific models (of which Ijjas et al.’s “classical inflation” is one subset), as a group of
33 physicists, including Guth et al., point out in their letter responding to Ijjas et al.’s Scientific
American article:
Inflation is not a unique theory but rather a class of models based on similar prin-
ciples. Of course, nobody believes that all these models are correct, so the relevant
question is whether there exists at least one model of inflation that seems well mo-
tivated, in terms of the underlying particle physics assumptions, and that correctly
describes the measurable properties of our universe. (Guth et al., 2017, 5)
In their letter, these scientists are primarily concerned to defend the scientificality of present day
work on inflationary cosmology against Ijjas et al.’s complaints. They therefore focus on the
testability of inflationary models, especially the consistency of some inflationary models with
observation, emphasizing in particular “the desirable process of using observation to thin out
the set of viable models” (Guth et al., 2017, 5). As individual inflationary models make specific
predictions for testable parameters, it is these models that are confirmed or disconfirmed by
observations, such as those made by the Planck satellite.
In their brief reply appended to this letter, Ijjas et al. claim that the authors miss their key
point, however, which concerns “the differences between the inflationary theory once thought
to be possible and the theory as understood today” (Guth et al., 2017, 7). They insist that
what Guth et al. describe as “standard inflationary models,” those whose predictions Guth et al.
(2017, 5) claim have been confirmed in the past (Guth et al., 2014, 112), are the models that
have now been strongly disconfirmed by recent observations with the Planck satellite. Because
of this, Ijjas et al. insist that the “highly flexible framework” (Ijjas et al., 2017) which has
emerged as contemporary inflationary theory cannot benefit from the fact that some predictions
of the old version were confirmed. To allow this would be, as they say, to conflate “two very
different paradigms” (Ijjas et al., 2014, 145).
Why do Ijjas et al. take there to be two different paradigms, where inflationary cosmologists
only see one? They appear to base the division on how predictions are generated from a theory.
In their view, three pieces are required to make predictions within an inflationary “scenario”:
a potential for the inflation field, initial conditions for the field, and a likelihood measure on
the space of possible “bubble” universes created by the inflationary process. They assert that
“classic inflation” (1) relies on a simple potential; (2) is understood to be insensitive to initial
conditions, since inflation is supposed to transform generic initial conditions into a flat, smooth
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universe; (3) a common-sense “volume”-based measure. In their view this is a promising setup,
because (1) the simple potential allows a single, continuous stage of inflation and has few
degrees of freedom and few parameters; (2) insensitivity to initial conditions means little fine-
tuning; (3) the measure makes it likely that we inhabit an inflated region, as these tending to
be larger than uninflated regions. And when it became possible to make observations of the
cosmic microwave background, these promises of classical inflation were made good on, with
the famous confirmed predictions of a slight red tilt in the spectrum of inhomogeneities, a large
tensor-to-scalar ratio, negligible non-Gaussianity, etc.
Nevertheless, according to Ijjas et al., despite its successes, there are long-standing con-
ceptual problems with this “classical” inflationary scenario: (1) even simple potentials end up
requiring considerable fine-tuning; (2) initial conditions required for inflation are not actually
generic; (3) since inflation leads to a multiverse, one has to face the measure problem. The
sum total of these problems implies, they claim, that classic inflation cannot in fact make any
generic predictions at all, including the ones that allegedly confirmed it. These long-standing
conceptual problems are later exacerbated by the Planck satellite’s observations, which is their
main point in (Ijjas et al., 2013): (1) the simple inflaton potentials are empirically disconfirmed,
(2) the favored plateau potentials require special initial conditions, and (3) these plateau models
naturally lead to a multiverse, hence the multiverse measure problem. Thus the classic infla-
tionary paradigm for generating predictions must be rejected as not only conceptually fraught
but empirically falsified.
Ijjas et al. argue that Guth et al.’s response depends on a very different set of inputs that they
believe clearly distinguishes their contemporary inflationary scenario from “classic” inflation.
Instead of a simple potential, the contemporary inflationary paradigm has it that the most plau-
sible potentials are complex, leading to many phases of inflation (since this is more plausible
than an “essentially featureless” potential up to the Planck scale). Instead of supposing that in-
flationary theory is insensitive to initial conditions, the present inflationary paradigm removes
initial conditions from consideration, supposing that the appearance of any special initial con-
ditions can be compensated for by adjusting the measure. Finally, instead of supposing that
the measure is a “naturally given one” (like the volume-weighted measure they mention), the
present inflationary paradigm takes it to be something that must be determined by theoretical
and empirical considerations.
Ijjas et al. find this scenario highly problematic—indeed, even unscientific. According to
them, predictions in such a scenario are impossible, since there is no paradigm-sanctioned
measure across the bubble universes of the multiverse (needed for making probabilistic predic-
tions). Therefore, predictions can only be attributed to specific models (or a classes of mod-
els) presently. While models admit of predictive testing, predictive testing of the inflationary
paradigm itself is precluded. Hence, all that inflationary cosmologists can offer is a promissory
note that predictions will be generically in agreement with observations once the right potential
and measure are identified. Moreover, complex potentials make a huge variety of behaviors
possible in different parts of the potential (slow-roll inflation, but also tunneling); leaving the
initial conditions unspecified thus makes it impossible to say what will happen in a particular
instance. Adding this to the measure problem, which they maintain has no obvious means of
solution, leaves inflationary cosmologists merely the task of adjusting the pieces (the potential,
the initial conditions, and the measure) in light of observations—in other words, of accommo-
dating the data. Since inflationary models are highly flexible in accommodating data, it seems
that this “postmodern” inflationary paradigm is not truly empirically testable; there can be no
possible falsification (and no possible confirmation either) of the paradigm. This is what makes
the contemporary paradigm unscientific in Ijjas et al.’s view. As they say already in their earlier
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paper, “if the only way the inflationary paradigm will work is by delicately designing all the
test criteria and data into the potential, this is trouble for the paradigm” (Ijjas et al., 2013, 264).
Given that Guth et al. emphasize the testability of inflationary models in their letter, it may
be easy to read into their response that they accept the basic terms of Ijjas et al.’s dilemma:
they accept that the “classical” inflationary models are disfavored by observation, and therefore
have simply chosen the second horn of “postmodern inflation.” Yet, according to Ijjas et al., the
problem with choosing this horn is that it forces one to “[discard] one of [science’s] defining
properties: empirical testability” (Ijjas et al., 2017, 39). This, of course, is the claim that Guth
et al. are at pains to dispute. 7 Nevertheless, one might understand their defense of the empirical
testability of inflation as succeeding only at the level of inflationary models, which fails to do
justice to Ijjas et al.’s critique, which is at the level of the inflationary paradigm.
As mentioned above, Guth et al. hold that the modern inflationary paradigm satisfies what
they regard as the canonical criterion of scientificality already, due to the uncontested fact that
it provides the basis for developing models that can be tested empirically. They also reject
Ijjas et al.’s methodological stricture that prohibits accommodation. In their view, the mere
fact that selecting certain empirically adequate models is currently a matter of accommodating
data (even within a highly flexible framework for model building) does not threaten the basic
scientificality of the approach. For them, it rather represents a fairly standard characteristic of
a research field at a stage where contingencies of model building are not yet highly constrained
by empirical data. Guth et al. suggest that once stronger constraints can be put on model build-
ing by more advanced and fine-grained empirical data, a stronger element of novel prediction
should be expected to re-emerge.8
Thus, with respect to the measure problem specifically, Guth et al. accept that some dis-
agreements between data and predictions of inflation may be legitimately interpreted as con-
sequences of a false measure choice, one which can be corrected by accommodation. In their
view, this does not pose a problem for scientificality—as long as the right measure can be ex-
pected to be implied by the theory when the latter is fully understood. Ruling out measures on
an empirical basis is thus simply part of the process of testing a theory by data, even though,
given the present insufficient understanding of the theory, data that are at variance with a given
prediction may simply indicate an incorrect understanding of the theory’s empirical implica-
tions (e.g. a false measure choice) rather than the invalidation of the theory itself.
Therefore, from Guth et al.’s point of view, Ijjas et al.’s “classical inflation” is an excessively
narrow construal of inflationary theory. While the Planck observations certainly do disfavor the
specific models characterized by this class of inflationary models, they do not necessarily dis-
favor the inflationary paradigm itself, for there is nothing in the basic concepts of inflationary
theory mandating the “simple” modeling assumptions that select this class of models. These
specific modeling assumptions were taken, quite naturally, for merely practical reasons in the
earlier development of the paradigm, such as for reasons of simplicity. But as Guth et al.
emphasize, “simplicity is subjective, and we see no reason to restrict attention to a narrow sub-
class” (Guth et al., 2017, 5) of inflationary models—and this is especially so from the present
theoretical understanding, where the assumptions of classical inflation now appear limited and
inadequate.
7In their response, they do note that their disagreement is broader than just this. Indeed, as they say, “we dis-
agree with a number of statements in their article, but in this letter, we will focus on our categorical disagreement
with these statements about the testability of inflation” (Guth et al., 2017, 5).
8One may also expect that a better conceptual understanding of various mechanisms of inflation in conjunction
with improved data may make arguments based on generic predictions more reliable than they are at the current
stage.
9
It is certainly fair to say, however, that inflationary theory exists in a state where there is
relatively little theoretical guidance available for the further development of the theory. One
important sign of this state of affairs is the extensive model-building efforts of inflationary
cosmologists: there exists a vast landscape of possible models in inflation, in some cases with
dramatically different consequences and deploying very different mechanisms for generating
inflation. The existence of so many varied possibilities shows that there is little indication
that the paradigm itself, as it is understood currently, entails particularly strong constraints on
the field of possible inflationary models. Undoubtedly, there are many presently unconceived
models waiting to be identified as well. Therefore, cosmologists seem to have little basis for
extracting criteria on what should count as a generic inflationary prediction from the currently
available field of inflationary models. What looks generic now may not look generic based on
a more extensive knowledge of the field of possible models of inflation (and vice versa).
It is therefore natural, even necessary, to look to observation for additional guidance on
how to develop the paradigm. As Guth et al. say, “inflation does not determine the shape of
the potential . . . but this only means that (given current theoretical technology) the details of
inflation will need to be determined by observation” (Guth et al., 2014, 114). Putting the point
in methodological terms, this amounts to saying that eliminative reasoning will have to play
an important role in developing the inflationary paradigm further (given the present epistemic
situation), as theoretically there are too many possibilities licensed by the paradigm—more
constraints are necessary (McCoy, forthcoming).
Given this elaboration of Guth et al.’s point of view, Ijjas et al.’s complaints about “postmod-
ern inflation,” for example that it is merely accommodating observations and cannot yield novel
predictions, misunderstand the current phase of research in inflationary cosmology: they mis-
read a constructive phase of eliminative reasoning for mere accommodation. While theoretical
cosmologists will, of course, continue to seek solutions of theoretical problems by theoretical
means (especially in the hopes of obtaining novel predictions), present epistemic circumstances
suggest that empirical input is valuable at this stage in order to make further progress.
We caution, however, against an inviting misreading of the role of eliminative reasoning in
this process. The aim of eliminative reasoning in a context like this is not to simply winnow
down the possible inflationary models by observation in order to select the “right” model of
inflation. That would indeed be mere accommodation. Rather, given the existence of a variety
of uncertainties attached to the paradigm (due to its internal problems, etc.), the use of elimina-
tive reasoning is a means to the further development of an improved theoretical understanding
of inflation and its foundations—in particular to aid in the attainment of the ultimate aim of
inflationary cosmology: to make a firm connection to fundamental physics, the sine qua non of
a successful account the evolution of the universe. To achieve this aim, theory must develop.
By identifying new constraints on the physical possibilities empirically, eliminative reasoning
can make a crucial contribution to the process of developing an improved understanding of
inflationary theory (or whatever might develop out of it).
To sum up the contrasting viewpoints of Ijjas et al. and Guth et al. we believe the essential
difference between the two sides boils down to different views on the process of theory testing.
Ijjas et al. endorse a “rigid,” conservative view of theory testing which assumes that a theory’s
empirical implications need to be unequivocally spelled out before empirical testing can be-
gin. Failing to reject an empirically invalidated theory or holding an empirically untestable
theory would consequently be detrimental to scientific progress. Guth et al., on the contrary,
hold that it would be detrimental to the scientific process to reject a scientific theory based on
such a strict application of a falsifiability criterion, one that fails to account for the complex
interaction between empirical testing and theory evolution. They assume that empirical tests
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of a theory can be productive even in contexts where the conceptual understanding of the the-
ory is in flux. While data, under such circumstances, have only reduced potential to confirm
or disconfirm the paradigm, they can nonetheless contribute to a better understanding of its
prospects and provide guidelines for further conceptual analysis. In short, empirical results
may be taken to indicate something about the paradigm’s theoretical content rather than solely
about its empirical viability.9
The analysis of this section evidently recapitulates some familiar issues in the philosophy
of science. Nevertheless, the analysis offered so far has not yet gotten fully to the bottom of
the disagreement between the two sides. In our view, Ijjas et al. still have a point to contend
if they object to the degree to which inflationary cosmologists accept a potentially long term
phase of accommodation, along with its attendant eschewal of rigid testing criteria. This fea-
ture distinguishes the field from most earlier contexts of empirical theory testing in physics.
Questions such as the following become more acute: Under what conditions is it legitimate
to weaken conditions on empirical testability in light of prospects of future, more unequivocal
predictive success? How long should cosmologists wait before they take the lack of solid testa-
bility of inflationary theory to be a threat to scientificality?10 In our terms, the reasonableness
of persisting with the inflationary paradigm depends on having credence in the viability of the
inflationary paradigm itself. If there is no basis for having this credence in the paradigm (as
Ijjas et al. allege), then using inflationary theory to guide an eliminative observational program
might be relatively ineffective in achieving any meaningful scientific progress in comparison
to instead developing alternative paradigms, such as those favored by Ijjas et al. One might
conclude that the issue reduces to nothing more than a matter of different camps placing “the
bets that count on which avenues of research will prove to be fruitful” (Earman and Mosterı́n,
1999, 46). We propose that a deeper look into the case of inflationary cosmology will reveal
that this conclusion is too hasty and too limited, for it overlooks a dimension of theoretical
assessment that is crucial for understanding the confirmation of scientific theories.
3 Taking Credence into Account
In this section, we elaborate the serious confirmational issue for the inflationary paradigm
which we believe is essentially present in Ijjas et al.’s argument, one that we find becomes
more conspicuous when theory assessment is viewed from a different perspective than the one
they adopt. The legitimate worry hinted at by Ijjas et al. does not reveal itself in terms of the
the falsifiability of the paradigm of inflation; it rather revolves around the issue of generating
credence in the paradigm.
A likelihoodist view on theory testing, like that adopted by Ijjas et al., avoids any direct
question of overall trust in a theory’s truth or viability. Other views on theory assessment, by
contrast, take credence in a theory to be at the very core of theory assessment. They assume
that the successful empirical testing of a theory provides epistemic justification for endorsing
that theory not just in comparison with empirically rejected competitors but in more absolute
terms. This understanding may or may not be linked to a realist commitment to the theory in
question (for which reason we prefer to use the more general term “viability” rather than couch
9In this respect, Ijjas et al.’s methodological view is in line with Popper’s “bold conjectures” and “refutations”
method of trial and error, whereas Guth et al.’s methodological view is more in line with the post-Popperian
methodological views of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan, who all highlight the productive resistance of “meta-
theoretical” units (paradigms, research programs, etc.) to change.
10These questions, of course, were left unanswered by the likes of Kuhn and Lakatos, who saw no prospect for
extending their historical perspective to future developments.
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the discussion in terms of the realist notion of truth). In any case, it takes strong empirical
confirmation to imply that the theory’s predictions within a given domain of empirical testing,
a given “empirical horizon,” should be taken as probably correct.
The importance of regarding credence in a paradigm is not just a philosophical nicety.
It is a natural part of discussions surrounding the scientific status of cosmic inflation even
within science. Indeed, trust in the theory is expressed quite forcefully by many proponents of
inflation. While we have seen that Guth et al.’s defense of the scientificality of inflation against
Ijjas et al. focuses on the point that inflationary models can be empirically tested and falsified,
they do point out the legitimacy of having trust in the theory as well:
During the more than 35 years of its existence, inflationary theory has gradually
become the main cosmological paradigm describing the early stages of the evolu-
tion of the universe and the formation of its large-scale structure. No one claims
that inflation has become certain; scientific theories don’t get proved the way math-
ematical theorems do, but as time passes, the successful ones become better and
better established by improved experimental tests and theoretical advances. This
has happened with inflation. (Guth et al., 2017, 6)
The degree of trust expressed in this quote and other statements by leading proponents of
inflation amounts to a strong commitment to the theory’s truth or viability.11
Representing the views of inflationary cosmologists thus requires a conceptual framework
that allows for addressing the issue of credence in a theory. The leading formal approach that
is capable of representing the described view on theory assessment is Bayesian confirmation
theory. It turns out that addressing the issue of credences is helpful for understanding Ijjas et
al.’s position as well. Although Ijjas et al. do not explicitly consider credences in their argument,
we find that their core criticism of inflation does not get off the ground as long as credence in the
theory is not considered part of the basic question of scientificality of inflationary cosmology.
3.1 A Bayesian Reconstrual of Ijjas et al.’s Reasoning
If one requires that empirical testing is essentially involved in generating significant credence
in a theory or model, then the Ijjas et al. view that the observations need to be in line with
what is expected according to the “internal logic of the paradigm” becomes cogent. The mere
fact that a given model predicts the data with a high likelihood is insufficient for trust in that
model if there are so many competitor models that no significant credence can be attributed to
any given model after the empirical test. If the collected data do generate significant credence
in the model, however, this means that significant credence is also necessarily generated in
the paradigm from which the model was built (after all, there is only so much credence to
go around!). Thus, a confirmational link to the paradigm itself thus emerges naturally once
significant credence is required.
Once credences become involved, Ijjas et al.’s criticism can be seen to amount to the fol-
lowing account. According to it, the use of eliminative reasoning with respect to models of
inflation would only be promising in two distinct scenarios:
11Cf. (Linde, 2008, 46): “Twenty five years ago, the inflationary theory looked like an exotic product of vivid
scientific imagination. Some of us believed that it possessed such a great explanatory potential that it had to be
correct; some others thought that it was too good to be true. Not many expected that it would be possible to verify
any of its predictions in our lifetime. Thanks to the enthusiastic work of many scientists, the inflationary theory is
gradually becoming a widely accepted cosmological paradigm, with many of its predictions being confirmed by
observational data. . . . the basic principles of inflationary cosmology are rather well established.”
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• In the first scenario, eliminative reasoning has a clear prospect of radically narrowing
down the spectrum of models that are in agreement with the data. If successful, this
process would eventually, in the foreseeable future, increase the credence significantly
in one or a few models that survive testing. (Those models may not be the last word,
to be sure, but they could be expected to eventually play the role of effective models of
a more fundamental theory.) This is roughly the scenario that was realized in the case
of the standard model of particle physics. Inflationary cosmology at the present stage,
however, does not seem to be anywhere near this scenario. The vast spectrum of possible
models and the complex relation between models and empirical data render the empirical
survival of just a small number of models implausible, surely for many years to come.
• In the second scenario, the paradigm itself unequivocally predicts certain quantitative
characteristics of the precision data. This scenario does not generate substantial credence
in individual models but in the theory of inflation itself. Inflationary cosmologists do
indeed often claim that significant and successful generic predictions of inflation exist.
For the second scenario, however, Ijjas et al.’s reasoning (on our Bayesian reading of it)
raises the question whether the generic predictions of inflation are sufficiently rigid to gener-
ate significant credence in the theory. These doubts play out at two levels. First, the fact that
generic models of inflation predict observed characteristics of the CMB, such as near Gaus-
sianity or adiabaticity, leaves open the question as to how deviations of the data from those
predictions would be or would have been handled. The flexibility of inflationary model build-
ing would presumably allow one to easily account for such deviations. But then, on what basis
should one decide whether those deviations speak against inflation per se or just indicate that
more intricate models of inflation are really instantiated in nature? This worry gains traction
due to the fact that the very simplest class of models has indeed been ruled out by experiment,
and this has not been taken to constitute a significant argument against inflation per se. Second,
Guth et al.’s approach to solving the measure problem, namely, that it should be guided by em-
pirical data, renders the question what is or is not “generic” in an inflationary context even more
complicated. In light of these specific doubts, an Ijjas et al. inspired Bayesian analysis would
imply that the agreement between collected data and generic predictions of inflation should not
generate significant credence in the theory of inflation at the current stage.
Ijjas et al.’s assessment of inflation thus suggests that neither of the two scenarios apply, so
there is no available way to generate substantial credence in inflation, nor can such be expected
in the foreseeable future. This verdict, for sure, does not render the process strictly speaking
unscientific from a Bayesian perspective. The formal conditions for Bayesian confirmation
are fulfilled even if confirmation is just incremental and insignificant. It raises the question,
however, how long one should feel content with a state of the research process where the
crucial role of empirical testing, which is to significantly increase the credence in a theory or
model, is not being fulfilled.
If credence in the theory is not supported by anything beyond a subjective choice of priors,
on what basis can physicists be confident that inflation is the correct paradigm? And if they
are in no position to answer that question, how confident can they be that eliminative reasoning
within the framework of inflation is helpful at all? For a brief period, working on a theory
without confidence may be fine. But for how long could physicists justify spending so many
intellectual resources on a hypothesis without legitimate reasons to assume that they work on a
viable theory?
As mentioned above, inflationary cosmologists, in stark disagreement with Ijjas et al., do
have a lot of trust in their theoretical paradigm. Is their trust unjustified? We believe that it is
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in fact justified, but this requires showing on what grounds they can discard the legitimate and
important worry stated above. We will argue in the following that those grounds involve taking
meta-empirical theory assessment (MEA) into account.
3.2 Collapsing the Distinction Between Classical and Post-empirical In-
flation
As a first step towards the inclusion of MEA in the analysis, we will spell out the Bayesian
representation of Ijjas et al.’s worry in a little more detail. This will lead us to an interesting
result: the Bayesian form of Ijjas et al.’s worry concerns classical inflation just as much as
“postmodern” inflation.
On Ijjas et al.’s account, the “postmodern” paradigm of inflation is not satisfactory because
it does not allow for significant testing of the theory based on testing models. The early theory
of inflation, to the contrary, constrained model building to a sufficient degree to be predictive
and therefore scientifically unproblematic. As we will see, this distinction cannot be upheld on
a Bayesian rendering of their account.
Let HC be the classic inflationary paradigm and HI be the full paradigm of inflation (that
which Ijjas et al. name “postmodern”). The two theories differ from each other only in applying
different constraints on model building. While HC only allows for certain simple potentials, HI
allows for more complex potentials as well. All models of HC are therefore also models of HI.
We can now formally define a third theory H+ that is complementary to HC: it differs from HI
only in disallowing simple potentials. We can thus write HI = HC ∨ H+.





If we insert the total probability




P(E|HC)P(HC) + P(E|H+)P(H+) + P(E|¬HI)P(¬HI)
, (3)





We assume, as a Bayesian proponent of Ijjas et al.-type reasoning would agree, that small
priors should be attributed to any (positive) hypothesis in the absence of substantial empirical
confirmation. This implies (1) that the prior probability P(HI) is small and (2) that the proba-
bility P(E|¬HI) is small for any distinctive set of empirical data E that could be used for theory
testing in the given context. Therefore, P(E) is small as well.
In Bayesian terms, Ijjas et al.’s claim corresponds to the following assertion. The spectrum
of models of HI is so wide that it will cover most of the parameter space of future empirical
outcomes, almost regardless of whatever imaginable evidence E is collected. HI, in other words,
is not predictive. Therefore, whatever E we collect, P(E|HI) will only be marginally higher than
P(E|¬HI) and, consequently, only marginally higher than P(E), which ultimately means that
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P(HI|E) will only be marginally higher than P(HI). In short, whatever the evidence E, it will
not provide significant confirmation of HI. Thus, we could only have substantial trust in HI if
we had already assigned a high prior to it. Assigning such high priors would go against the basic
assumptions of the Ijjas et al.-inspired Bayesian; indeed, it should be regarded as unscientific
per se. Even worse, in the given case it would be impossible to reduce the high probability of
HI based on empirical testing because most imaginable evidence could be accommodated by
HI.
This line of reasoning, in its own right, amounts to a coherent argument against theories
like cosmic inflation. Ijjas et al. make the additional step, however, to contrast the described
situation with the case of HC. They argue that HC has a sufficiently constrained set of models
to generically predict certain data E. This means that P(E|HC) is assumed to be much higher
than P(E|¬HC) and, consequently, much higher than P(E). Thus, according to equation (4), we
have a sufficient basis for obtaining a large P(HC|E), which amounts to significant confirmation
of HC.
Yet this further step of Ijjas et al. cannot be captured within a Bayesian framework at the
same time as the first line of reasoning. The problem is the following. Calling HC rather
than HI the “theory of inflation” does not mean that the models covered by H+ disappear. The
conclusion reached in the previous paragraph was that P(HI|E) would always remain small,
whatever the evidence. This conclusion can be written as the statement that P(HC|E) + P(H+|E)
always remains small. This requirement, however, obviously does not allow for large P(HC|E).
Assuming that substantial confirmation for HC can be achieved without having substantial con-
firmation of HI as well is probabilistically inconsistent.
Testing HC thus faces the same core problem as testing specific models of HI. Neither HC
nor HI can acquire significant probabilities based on the method of empirical testing. If testing
HI is not sufficient for vindicating the scientific process, neither is testing HC. In other words, in
order to argue that HC can find significant empirically confirmation, it is necessary to establish
that HI can find significant empirical confirmation as well. If Ijjas et al. provide substantial
reasons to suspect a structural failure of HI to allow for significant empirical confirmation, a
coherent probabilistic analysis raises the very same problem for classic inflation as well.
One could, in order to rescue Ijjas et al.’s reasoning in this setting, favor classic inflation
over “postmodern” inflation by adding one additional element to their assumptions about classic
inflation. Namely, one would need to assume P(H+) << P(HC). In words, one would need to
assume that a simple model of inflation of the kind included in HC is a priori much more
probable than a complex model that resides in H+. Note that this is a freedom not open to
the proponent of a more comprehensive definition of the inflationary paradigm: if the theory
HI allows for two distinct classes of models, it would seem highly questionable to declare,
by fiat, that the empirical implications of one of those classes of models is predicted by the
theory. (This is, in effect, the charge Ijjas et al. raise against the claim made by proponents of
inflationary theory that inflation is confirmed by the agreement between data and the predictions
of generic models). Attributing a very low prior to H+ as opposed to an independent theory HC,
however, would seem feasible. It would suppress the option of complex models and thereby
improve the situation for HC: one would have a prediction of HC that translates into a high
P(E|HC), and no preference for E if HC is false. This is, of course, the canonical setup for
empirical confirmation.
This solution appears to be entirely ad hoc however. What could be the reasons for expect-
ing, a priori, HC rather than H+? No satisfactory answer seems available that reaches beyond
a raw and unfounded prejudice in favor of simple solutions. A probabilistic representation of
Ijjas et al.’s endorsement of classic inflation thus would have to rely on the physically and con-
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ceptually unjustified implicit conviction that viable inflationary models be simple. As soon as
that unsupported conviction is abandoned, classic inflation is no more confirmable than “post-
modern” inflation.
4 Applying Meta-Empirical Confirmation to Inflation
Is there a more promising mechanism for generating trust in inflation? The above analysis
points in the right direction already: in order to establish trust in a given theory, it is crucial
to make some assumptions about the probabilities of alternatives to the theory under scrutiny.
A satisfactory analysis of the status of inflation thus must not limit its reach to whatever one
chooses to call the theory of inflation. On the contrary, it needs to take up the formidable task
of acquiring some degree of understanding of the probabilities attributed to theories beyond the
theory under scrutiny. Ijjas et al.’s inclination to rule out complex models by simplicity is a
crude attempt at doing so, but it must fail as a matter of credence due to the lack of scientific
motivation (as a pragmatic motivation, it is of course acceptable). Thus, what is needed is a
less ad hoc way of assessing the array of possibilities that lies beyond the theory under scrutiny,
including their probability structure.
Dawid (2006, 2013, 2020) has developed a method of theory assessment in line with that
general idea under the name “meta-empirical confirmation” (MEC).12 MEC is based on col-
lecting evidence F for the claim that a theory under scrutiny has few or no possible scientific
alternatives. The kind of evidence that supports that kind of claim is called meta-empirical
evidence. Meta-empirical evidence F for a theory H differs from empirical evidence E in lying
beyond the theory’s intended predictive domain: it is not of the kind that could be predicted
or excluded by the theory. At the core of MEC lies what Dawid calls the no-alternatives argu-
ment (NAA), which infers a lack of possible alternatives from the observation FNA that, despite
intense and long lasting searches for such alternatives, none were found. As there are salient
potential defeaters to an argument like this (the scientists were simply looking “in the wrong
place,” for example), in order to be acknowledged as significant support of the given theory’s
viability, Dawid argues that the typical NAA must be supported (1) by a meta-inductive ar-
gument (MIA) based on the observation FMI that no-alternative assessments in comparable
contexts tended to be predictively successful when empirically tested and, in many cases, (2)
by an unexpected explanation argument (UEA) that is based on the observation FUE that the
given theory has turned out to explain aspects of physics it was not developed to explain.13
In the following, we will distinguish genuine MEC, that is, updating solely on meta-empirical
evidence F, from what we will be calling meta-empirical assessment (MEA). MEA relies on
meta-empirical evidence F, just like MEC, but additionally involves updating under new em-
pirical evidence E. As we will see, both modes of reasoning are relevant in the context of
inflation.
It does not take an intense and long lasting search to establish that patterns of MEA-type
reasoning are deployed by inflationary cosmologists when they argue for the viability of the
theory of inflation. A particularly clear example is Andrei Linde’s paper already quoted (fn.
11). At another point in the same paper, he writes:
12In (Dawid, 2013), the described method of theory assessment is presented as a specific realization of a wider
group of arguments of “non-empirical confirmation.” The three specific arguments described below have more
recently been given the name “meta-empirical confirmation” in (Dawid, 2020) in order to distinguish them from
the wider class of non-empirical arguments.
13We will pass over further details of Dawid’s frameworks, which can be found in the references cited at the
head of the paragraph.
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The inflationary scenario is very versatile, and now, after 25 years of persistent
attempts of many physicists to propose an alternative to inflation, we still do not
know any other way to construct a consistent cosmological theory. . . . There were
many attempts to propose an alternative to inflation in recent years. In general,
this could be a very healthy tendency. If one of these attempts will succeed, it will
be of great importance. If none of them are successful, it will be an additional
demonstration of the advantages of inflationary cosmology. (Linde, 2008, 21–2)
Linde clearly indicates in this quote that a failure to find alternatives to inflation despite ex-
tensive search for such alternatives strengthens the case for inflation itself. If one interprets
“demonstration of the advantages of inflationary cosmology” in an epistemic sense, then this is
a full fledged case of an NAA.
As said, an NAA becomes significant only if it is supported by an MIA and possibly also
by elements of UEA-type reasoning. Inflationary cosmologists like Linde therefore must base
their trust in NAA-type reasoning on the understanding that other theories in recent high en-
ergy physics and cosmology that seemed without convincing alternatives showed an eventual
tendency of predictive success. Observations that can support MIA type reasoning can be
identified both in cosmology as well as in high energy physics. In high energy physics, the pre-
dictive success of standard model physics instills trust in the understanding that the techniques
used to build scalar potentials within the framework of gauge field theory are the right way to
go when aiming at constructing models of inflation. In the context of cosmology, James Pee-
bles has emphasized in his recent book (Peebles, 2020) the extent to which cosmologists in the
1950s and 1960s had trust in the viability of general relativity over many orders of magnitude,
even though empirical support for it was constrained at a fairly narrow range of distance scales
at the time. Peebles argues that this degree of trust would not be plausible without reliance on
non-empirical theory assessment. Peebles does not connect his point to an assessment of infla-
tion however. But proponents of inflationary cosmology can use the eventual empirical success
of general relativity at distance scales where it was initially trusted (without empirical basis) in
MIA type reasoning to support a scarcity of options at the fundamental level of cosmological
theory building.
An NAA could also find further support by cases of unexpected explanation (UEA) that
show up in inflationary cosmology. We will mention only one possible case of a UEA that is
controversial, but interesting. For adherents of anthropic reasoning within a multiverse frame-
work, the latter provides the only satisfactory explanation of the fine-tuning of the cosmological
constant. The scenario where a theory that was developed for explaining the isotropy and flat-
ness of the observed universe also naturally leads to a multiverse scenario which provides the
basis for an anthropic explanation of the fine-tuning of the cosmological constant is a pure case
of UEA.
We have thus established two significant points. First, MEA-type reasoning has plausibility
in the context of inflationary cosmology: all three pure MEA modes of reasoning, NAA, MIA,
and UEA, can be developed in that context. Second, MEA is indeed employed by some of the
theory’s leading proponents (e.g., Linde, Peebles). Of course, the fact that MEA arguments
can be and are used in cosmology does not tell us how strong these arguments are in the given
context. The strength of an NAA, in particular, will depend on the extend to which proponents
of inflation succeed in offering convincing reasons for discarding non-inflationary accounts,
such as the ekpyrotic universe (Khoury et al., 2001), string gas cosmology (Brandenberger
and Vafa, 1989), or others, as promising alternatives. The strength of an MIA will depend
on the plausibility of using examples from earlier cosmology to understand the spectrum of
alternatives today. The usefulness of anthropic reasoning in a UEA hinges on the extent to
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which one acknowledges anthropic arguments as legitimate physical reasoning. In the present
paper, we refrain entirely from weighing in on these debates. While some of them, in particular
the issue of anthropic reasoning, do have a philosophical aspect, the comparison of merits
and problems of competing physical theories, which sits at the core of any NAA argument,
obviously must play out largely among the physicists involved in the corresponding research
programs. The aim of the present paper can only be to contribute to the clarification of the
epistemic argumentative framework within which the debates on physical content can be most
profitably carried out.
In this vein, we now need to turn to the question: how do MEA modes of reasoning, to
the extent they are successful, play out in the context of inflationary cosmology? The simplest
suggestion would be to frame MEA modes of reasoning as full fledged MEC, analogous to the
way they are used, for example, in the context of string theory. Confirmation on that account
would be fully based on meta-level observations beyond the theory’s intended domain. If infla-
tionary cosmologists deem it plausible to endorse an NAA, this would license assuming a small
probability P(E|¬HI). In other words, MEC can license trust in cosmic inflation based solely
on the assessment that alternative solutions to the problems inflation aims to solve are unlikely
to exist.
The described view does not account for current practices in cosmology, however, as great
effort is put into the acquisition of new cosmological data. As discussed in previous sections,
proponents of inflation take that data to provide empirical support for inflation, while critics
such as Ijjas et al. deny it. The current disputes therefore are not about the justification of
meta-empirical confirmation, but about assessing the relevance of the available empirical data.
As we are going to demonstrate now, MEA nevertheless plays a crucial, though slightly
different role in the given context: it is crucial for turning new empirical evidence E into sig-
nificant empirical confirmation of a given theory H. In order to understand this mechanism, we
need to return to equation (4). According to this equation, a high P(E|HI) is not necessary for
extracting a high P(HI|E) from low priors P(HI). What is needed is:
P(E|¬HI) << P(E|HI) (5)
Let us now assume a scenario where E is consistent with HI but not significantly favored by
it. Let us further assume that we have a strong NAA regarding HI based on E: we consider it
very unlikely that there exists any theory other than HI that is consistent with data E. In such a
scenario, E looks plausible though not probable based on assuming HI. It looks very improbable
based on assuming ¬HI. In other words, a strong NAA generates exactly the condition stated
in equation (5) based on the mere fact that the hypothesis of an inflationary phase does have
models that are in agreement with the data.
To be sure, the understanding that E arises generically based on HI and therefore implies a
high value for P(E|HI) would substantially increase the confirmation value of E. But the gener-
icity argument is not strictly necessary. Even for the observer who fully rejects the significance
of genericity claims in the given context, an NAA asserting that there probably are no theories
other than HI that can account for data E suppresses P(E|¬HI) against P(E|HI), and on that basis
generates significant confirmation of HI by E.
Thus, our analysis shows that, even if Ijjas et al. were right that HI is so flexible that it allows
for constructing models which can accommodate any precision data that may be collected, this
would not block confirmation of HI by new precision data. An increase in the precision of the
data, as obtained, for example, through new CMB precision measurements, can indeed play a
double role. Within the context of inflation, it selects models of inflation that are in agreement
with that data and thereby improves the understanding of the way the theory is realized. At
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the same time, it raises the bar for alternatives to inflation. The more complex and specific the
structure of the precision data, the more convincing a no alternatives argument with respect to
alternatives to inflation can become.
In the given scenario, it is the no alternatives argument rather than the comparison between
a model’s prediction and the data itself that reaches beyond the level of model testing towards
actual confirmation of the inflation paradigm. A high posterior attributed to inflation based
on MEA can then provide the basis for confidence in a productive long term evolution of the
research field. If MEA-based reasoning suggests that inflation is on the right track, this can also
increase trust in the prospect that ruling out models and increasing the conceptual understanding
of the theory in the long run will lead towards a more stable and rigorous regime of empirical
testing, as indeed is suggested by Guth et al.
5 Conclusion: Future Expectations
The dispute between Ijjas et al. and Guth et al. is both philosophically more interesting and
conceptually more intricate than the polemical style of the debate would suggest. The fairly
complex nature of the debate merits a brief recapitulation of the philosophical reconstruction
we have proposed.
The first philosophical disagreement we unearthed concerns the admissible format of theory
testing (§2). Ijjas et al. adhere to a rigid, traditional view of theory testing that requires that
theories are completed before empirical testing starts, which is necessary in order to spell out
their predictions and the conceptual framework of empirical testing. On that basis, the theory
can then be empirically tested and validated. Guth et al., by contrast, endorse a more fluid
and processual approach to empirical testing: models of theories can be empirically tested
before the spectrum of models, the theory’s predictions, or even the conceptual framework of
empirical testing (cf. the measure problem) has been fully specified. Theory development and
theory testing are thereby intertwined. The focus of testing may, at some stage, not be on the
falsification of the overall theory but on the exploration of the theory’s characteristics.
Although their disagreement is substantially based on their views about testability, the fun-
damental complaint of Ijjas et al. is that inflationary theory is neither confirmable nor discon-
firmable, due to its fluidity and flexibility. Guth et al. respond to this criticism with a strictly
empiricist argument. They point out that the testing of models is fully sufficient for scientific
legitimacy. While this rejoinder works well against the more exaggerated claims of Ijjas et al.
about scientificality, it is in tension with the strong endorsement of inflation by many of the
theory’s proponents. Those endorsements, indicate a view on the scientific process that takes
the generation of trust in empirically confirmed scientific theories to be an essential element of
science.
To capture this element, we found it useful to frame the disagreement on the scientific
status of inflation in Bayesian terms, which explicitly incorporates credences in theories as a
basic aspect of the framework. By framing Ijjas et al.’s arguments in this context, we are led to
what emerges as a crucial issue for inflationary cosmology: the nature of confirmation.
As we showed, the Bayesian analysis allows for two different strategies of theory eval-
uation. On the one hand, a conservative understanding of Bayesian confirmation that con-
strains confirming data to what lies within the tested theory’s intended domain vindicates the
worry put forward by Ijjas et al.: no significant empirical confirmation of inflation or any of
its models can be generated under the present circumstances. But on this conservative under-
standing of Bayesian confirmation, classic inflation—which Ijjas et al. take to be scientifically
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unproblematic—cannot be significantly confirmed either. Thus, a narrow understanding of con-
firmation fails to allow for a meaningful understanding of the way inflationary cosmology can
be tested. A more liberal strategy (MEA) which allows confirming data to lie outside the the-
ory’s intended domain does, however, provide a basis for possible significant confirmation of
inflation. Once this wider concept of theory confirmation is applied, the worries presented by
Ijjas et al. can be countered and the view on inflation expressed by Guth et al. can be vindicated.
We emphasize that our paper only aims to provide an analysis of the general structure
and coherence of the epistemic reasoning deployed in this dispute on the scientific status of
inflation. We have not aimed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the factual arguments
in favor of inflation. To what extent an NAA, an MIA and a UEA are convincing, we regard
that as something which must be decided by a careful, in depth scientific assessment of the
given case by knowledgeable practitioners, an assessment which, however, would be aided by
the conceptual framework advanced here.
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